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1 
ARBITRATION, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, 
AND THE RIGHT TO INTERLOCUTORY 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
THEODORE J. HAWKINS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Based upon an arbitration clause, a nonsignatory to a 
contract wants to compel a signatory to arbitrate a dispute.  The 
nonsignatory claims to be in privity with a party who did sign the 
agreement.  Can the nonsignatory immediately appeal a decision 
by a federal district court refusing to compel arbitration and 
ordering the parties to litigate their dispute?   
Consider the facts of Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Provost, Colt 
& Mosle, LLP:  In that case, a large prosperous construction 
corporation wanted to sell a small industrial equipment company 
it owned.1  The corporation sought to make the highest possible 
profit but pay the lowest possible taxes on the sale.  To this end, 
it consulted with a highly regarded accounting firm that advised 
the corporation to invest in a tax shelter to minimize its exposure 
following the sale.2  To help the construction corporation properly 
execute the complicated tax shelter, the accounting firm enlisted 
the help of a law firm and a financial services boutique.3  
Although the financial services boutique signed an agreement to 
arbitrate any disputes that might arise concerning its services, 
the law firm and accounting firm signed no such agreement.4  
Everything was going according to plan until the construction 
corporation received a letter from the IRS explaining that the tax 
shelter it invested in was “abusive” and illegal.  Consequently, 
 
† J.D., 2010, St. John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Cornell University 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations. I would like to thank Professor Paul Kirgis 
for all his help and insight during the writing process. I would also like to thank the 
St. John’s Law Review for making the Online Journal a reality. 
1 See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 599 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
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the corporation had to pay $25 million in penalties to the IRS.5  
The head of the construction company was furious and directed 
his attorneys to sue the law firm and accounting firm in federal 
court.6  Both defendants, wary of a large jury verdict, attempted 
to have the case dismissed in favor of arbitration based upon the 
construction company’s agreement with the financial boutique.7  
The district court refused to allow the law firm and the 
accounting firm to arbitrate the dispute and both firms sought an 
immediate appeal.8  Does the law firm and accounting firm have 
a right to an interlocutory appeal on the issue of arbitrability?  
How should an appellate court handle such a complicated 
question?  For a long time circuit courts disagreed about whether 
a nonsignatory had jurisdiction to appeal in this situation.9  This 
narrow issue, however, was recently taken up and resolved by 
the Supreme Court in Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle.10 
Conflicts similar to the one described above arise as a result 
of a steady increase in the use of commercial arbitration in 
America over the last thirty years.11  Today, arbitration is a 
popular alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) mechanism that 
many companies, industries, and nations recognize as superior to 
litigation.  In 1976 at the “Pound Conference,” Chief Justice 
Warren Burger gave his now famous speech advocating the 
proliferation of arbitration and other ADR techniques in an effort 
to upgrade an outdated legal system strained by litigation.12  
Appealing to the legal community, Justice Burger praised 
arbitration as a more efficient and fair conflict resolution 
mechanism, that could be used to solve the problems of the 
twenty-first century.13  “There is nothing incompatible[, he said,] 
 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id.   
9 See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 
2008) (acknowledging the “circuit split on [the] question of [interlocutory] appellate 
jurisdiction”). 
10 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1903 (2009). 
11 See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration 
and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 105 n.2 (1997). 
12 See Hon. Warren E. Burger, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., Need of Systematic 
Anticipation, Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 FED. 
RULES DECISIONS 79, 92–94 (1976). 
13 See id. 
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between efficiency and justice.”14  Many corporations favor 
arbitration, not only because it is efficient and inexpensive, but 
also because arbitration decisions are confidential,15 and the 
parties have the ability to appoint an arbitrator who is an expert 
in the subject matter of a contract.16 
Just as Justice Burger advocated, the use of arbitration has 
steadily expanded since 1976.17  Today, it has become a dominant 
mechanism through which international commercial disputes  
are resolved,18 as well as the chosen method used to resolve 
consumer19 and securities disputes.20  Despite proliferation in 
some areas, there is still widespread resistance to the use of 
arbitration by “large sophisticated actors” in the United States.21  
In a study of 2,800 contracts executed by publicly held companies 
in 2002, it was determined that only eleven percent of the 
agreements contained arbitration clauses.22  The authors of the 
study reasoned that “[t]he paucity of such clauses may partially 
reflect the view of corporate counsel that the decision . . . to 
include binding arbitration in an agreement is not one that can 
be made across the board, but rather depends on the needs and 
circumstances of the parties.”23   
One of the least attractive aspects of an arbitration 
proceeding is the lack of appellate review.24  Although this 
negative attribute can be offset by both parties’ ability to choose 
 
14 Id. at 92. 
15 William F. Fox, How To Think About International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution, SN056 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 455, § 2.02(a)(4) (2008). 
16 Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse 
Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 259 (2005). 
17 See Levin, supra note 11. 
18 Eric Bergsten, The Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 289, 300 (2005) (“By 2005, the American business and legal 
communities accepted arbitration as the preferred method of settlement of 
international commercial disputes.”). Contra Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration 
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 350, 
351 (2007) (finding that only twenty percent of international contracts contain 
arbitration clauses). 
19 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 18, at 373. 
20 See Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining 
Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 PACE L. 
REV. 113, 113 (2005). 
21 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 18, at 335. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 368. 
24 See id. at 340. 
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an arbitrator with expertise in the subject matter of the contract, 
the lack of appellate review could be a deal breaker for 
corporations that frequently enter into complicated commercial 
deals where large sums of money are at stake.  Even if litigation 
costs substantially more than arbitration, companies that have 
deep pockets may simply be unwilling to forgo the opportunity to 
overturn an unfavorable verdict.25  In addition, a related 
difference between arbitration and litigation is the perception 
that jury verdicts are statistically higher than arbitration 
awards.26  Given the potential drawbacks to arbitration, it is easy 
to see why the threshold issue of arbitrability can turn into a 
contentious dispute if it is unclear whether the parties entered 
into an agreement to arbitrate. 
One type of dispute that has emerged in the last decade 
involves the issue of arbitrability interwoven with the concept of 
equitable estoppel.  This category is primarily made up of 
contract disputes between corporations in which a nonsignatory 
to the contract is either attempting to compel arbitration or being 
compelled to arbitrate.27  Such controversies exist because of the 
increasing complexity of business organizations in our time.28  
For example, attached to many multinational parent 
corporations are labyrinths of corporate entities that are wholly 
owned, partly owned, or merely weakly associated with the 
parent company.  This organizational structure can lead to 
uncertainty as to who is bound by an arbitration agreement 
signed by a particular corporate entity.29 
 
25 See Charles E. Buffon & Joshua D. Wolson, Antitrust Arbitration Counseling, 
19 ANTITRUST 31, 33 (2004) (discussing why the inability to appeal an arbitration 
decision might discourage arbitration of a large antitrust claim). 
26 See Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 198 (2005). 
27 See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc., v. Residuos Industriales Multiquim, S.A. de C.V., 
372 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). 
28 See id. A nonsignatory sought to stay the litigation of a dispute pending the 
outcome of an arbitration proceeding involving the same issue. See id. The 
controversy arose because it was unclear whether the former parent company or the 
purchaser of smaller company was responsible for a debt resulting from the breach 
of an equipment lease. See id. 
29 See, e.g., Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 43 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (discussing the arbitrability of claims against a nonsignatory subsidiary 
and corporate officers). 
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In general, arbitration agreements are enforceable only if 
they are in writing.30  However, arbitration can also be compelled 
through the concept of equitable estoppel.  An equitable estoppel 
issue can arise when only one of the parties to a dispute signed a 
written arbitration agreement and, based upon that agreement, 
either the signatory or the nonsignatory seeks to compel the 
other party to arbitrate.31  In this situation the party seeking to 
compel arbitration asserts that it is unfair for its adversary to 
deny the existence a written agreement.  The standard for 
determining whether equitable estoppel applies differs depending 
upon which party is attempting to compel arbitration.32  
Although it is commonly accepted that a signatory can compel a 
nonsignatory to arbitrate a dispute, only recently has law 
developed that permits a nonsignatory to compel a signatory to 
arbitrate a dispute.33  This Note will focus only on situations in 
which a nonsignatory seeks to compel a signatory to arbitrate.  
Recently, in Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, the Supreme 
Court resolved a split between the circuits dealing with this very 
issue.34  The court decided that § 16 of the FAA gives federal 
appellate courts jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal 
when a litigant appeals from an order denying a stay in litigation 
in favor of an arbitration, regardless of whether the litigant 
signed a written arbitration agreement or not.35  Before the 
decision, federal circuit courts disagreed whether a nonsignatory 
had the right to appeal an order by the district court refusing to 
compel arbitration.  One group of circuits held that a 
nonsignatory could not appeal such a decision because the 
Federal Arbitration (FAA) required a written arbitration 
agreement as a prerequisite to the appeal.  These courts 
reasoned that because the nonsignatory did not sign a written 
 
30 Rojas v. TK Commc’n, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The FAA 
requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing.” (quoting Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 n.1 (1991)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
31 See, e.g., Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Provost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
32 See Thompson-CSF v. AAA, 64 F.3d 773, 776–79 (2d Cir. 1995). 
33 See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“Other circuits have, in a few instances, allowed a non-signatory to a contract 
with an arbitration clause to compel arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory, 
including when the action is intertwined with, and dependent upon, that contract.”). 
34 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1903 (2009). 
35 See id. 
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arbitration agreement, it was precluded from asserting that such 
an agreement existed and therefore could not appeal.  Holding to 
the contrary, the Second and Fifth Circuits decided cases that 
allowed nonsignatories to appeal.  These circuits based appellate 
jurisdiction on the strength of the nonsignatories’ equitable 
estoppel claim.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Arthur 
Anderson, explained that under the “clear and unambiguous” 
language of § 16 of the FAA, any litigant who asks the court to 
compel arbitration and is denied is entitled to an immediate 
appeal.36  
This Note will examine the controversy between the circuits 
and discuss how the Supreme Court reconciled the competing 
viewpoints with the plain language of the FAA.  Part I will 
discuss the law of equitable estoppel and how it is applied when 
arbitration is at issue.  Part II will address the cases leading up 
to the Supreme Court decision.  Finally, Part III will analyze the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Anderson and recommend 
that both the policy and the law favor a bright-line rule allowing 
interlocutory appeals by parties seeking to arbitrate through 
equitable estoppel. 
I. THE USE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL TO COMPEL PARTIES TO 
ARBITRATE 
Traditionally, equitable estoppel is a defense available to a 
promisee when the promisor wrongfully denies the existence of a 
contract that the promisee relied upon.  Equitable estoppel is a 
principle firmly grounded in fairness, which has evolved from 
humble beginnings.37  In the the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Carlisle, equitable estoppel was used as a mechanism to resolve a 
dispute in which one party did not sign a written agreement to 
arbitrate.  There, notwithstanding that fact that none of the 
defendants signed an  agreement, they claimed that  it was 
 
36 Id. at 1898. 
37 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.11, at 39 (Joseph M. 
Perillo ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2010) (1981) (“[M]ore and more we are seeing 
these equitable doctrines come forward to achieve justice and fair dealing between 
[individuals]. The literal constructionists live by the letter of the contract—they 
recognize nothing which is not expressed. Estoppel did not arise, like the mists of 
creation; it was born out of conscience and embodied in the law to right wrongs.” 
(quoting Roseth v. St. Paul Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 105, 110–11 (S.D. 
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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unjust not to allow them to arbitrate their claims.38  Equitable 
estoppel “is designed to prevent injustice by barring a 
party . . . from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, 
admissions, representations, or silence.”39  In essence, equitable 
estoppel exists to prevent a party from “trying to have his cake 
and eat it too; that is, from ‘rely[ing] on the contract when it 
works to [his] advantage [by establishing the claim], and 
repudiat[ing] it when it works to [his] disadvantage [by requiring 
arbitration].’ ”40  Put another way, in some circumstances, 
fairness dictates that a party can be precluded from asserting the 
lack of a written agreement as a defense against a motion to 
compel arbitration. 
It is “generally accepted that in the context of a motion to 
compel arbitration, federal law controls the issue of equitable 
estoppel.”41  Although the FAA requires that an arbitration 
agreement be in writing,42 the Supreme Court has held that an 
arbitration clause is no different than any other contract  
 
 
38 MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 13:8 (2010) 
(“Equitable estoppel allows a party to be estopped from repudiating a contract on 
which the other party has relied and as a result of which the other party has 
changed its position so that it will suffer an injury if the contract is repudiated.”). 
Equitable estoppel differs from the concept of promissory estoppel. See Tiffany Inc. v. 
W. M. K. Transit Mix, 493 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Ariz. 1972) (“[T]he major distinction 
between equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel is that equitable estoppel is 
available only as a defense, while promissory estoppel can be used as a cause of 
action for damages . . . . [E]stoppel is a shield, not a sword, hence it forms no basis 
for a cause of action for damages in contrast to promissory estoppel which gives rise 
to a cause of action for damages.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 90 (1981). 
39 Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 205 So. 2d 35, 40 (La. 
1967). 
40 Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist P.C., 412 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(quoting In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir. 
2002)). 
41 Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Application of Equitable Estoppel 
Against Nonsignatory To Compel Arbitration Under Federal Law, 43 A.L.R. FED. 2d 
275 § 3 (2010). Moreover, issues of arbitrability should always be decided by a court 
rather than an arbitrator. See id. Equitable estoppel can be either a question of law, 
a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, depending on the 
circumstances. See 31 C.J.S. ESTOPPEL AND WAVIER § 291 (2010). In general, “where 
the facts are undisputed and only one inference may be drawn . . . the question of 
estoppel is one of law, but otherwise it is one of fact.” Id. 
42 Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The FAA 
requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing.”). 
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language.43  Thus, the same common law equitable defenses 
developed in contract law are available to parties seeking to 
enforce an arbitration clause.44 
The application of equitable estoppel to arbitration 
agreements initially led to the “development of legal and 
equitable principles whereby a nonsignatory to an arbitration 
agreement [could] be compelled to arbitrate based upon implied 
consent.”45  Such situations arose when a party that signed an 
arbitration agreement sought to compel arbitration against a 
party that did not signed the agreement.  Subsequently, an 
alternative doctrine emerged permitting nonsignatories to 
compel signatories to arbitrate based upon equitable estoppel in 
limited situations.46  Although a signatory almost always has 
standing to bring a suit compelling a nonsignatory to arbitrate, it 
is much less certain whether a nonsignatory has standing since 
its connection to the contract is much less certain.  Nevertheless, 
courts have found that a nonsignatory may compel a signatory to 
arbitrate when there is a “close relationship between the entities 
 
43 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(finding that general contract law defenses may be applied to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement); J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, III, Equitable Estoppel 
as a Basis for Compelling Nonsignatories To Arbitrate—A Bridge Too Far?, 21 REV. 
LITIG. 593, 594 (2002). 
44 See Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776–79 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
45 Uloth & Rial, supra note 43, at 594; see also Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776–79. 
These traditional theories originated from prior Second Circuit Decisions. See, e.g., 
Fisser v. Int’l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 241 n.6 (2d Cir. 1960). In Thomson-CSF, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarized five “traditional” contract theories 
through which a signatory could compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate: 
(1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) veil piercing/alter ego, 
and (5) estoppel. See Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776–79. According to the Second 
Circuit, a signatory can compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate based upon an 
“incorporation by reference” theory when the two parties “entered into a separate 
contractual relationship . . . which incorporates the existing arbitration clause.” Id. 
at 777. Similarly, a signatory can compel arbitration under an “assumption” theory 
when a nonsignatory “manifest[s] a clear intention to arbitrate” by, for example, 
sending a representative to the arbitration proceeding. Id. In addition, arbitration 
can be compelled under a “veil-piercing/alter-ego” theory when “a parent corporation 
and its subsidiary . . . demonstrate[ ] a virtual abandonment of separateness.” Id. at 
777–78. Moreover, “[t]raditional principles of agency law may bind a nonsignatory to 
an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 777. Finally, principles of equitable estoppel can be 
used to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate when it is clear that the nonsignatory 
had an agreement in fact to accept arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
Id. at 778. 
46 Rosenhouse, supra note 41, § 4. 
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involved” and the claims are “intimately founded and 
intertwined” with the terms of the contract.47  Since the right to 
compel arbitration is contractual in nature, a nonsignatory 
agent, successor, or third party beneficiary may have standing to 
compel arbitration based upon equitable estoppel.48  Generally, in 
cases decided in favor of allowing a nonsignatory to compel 
arbitration, the nonsignatory “has a contractual or other business 
relationship with [a] nonadverse party to the arbitration 
agreement, giving the non-signatory an obvious interest in the 
success of the agreement between the two signatories.”49  The 
limited situations in which a nonsignatory can estop a signatory 
from denying the existence of an obligation to arbitrate can be 
broken down into three broad relational categories: (1) when the 
nonsignatory has a financial stake in a nonadverse signatory; 
(2) when a nonsignatory is the purchaser of goods from a 
signatory; and (3) when a nonsignatory provides goods and 
services to a signatory.50  Examples of each of these situations are 
discussed below.  These examples are illustrative of the types of 
controversies and parties that were affected by the Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.51 is a case 
that falls into the first relational category—it involves claims by 
a nonsignatory that had a financial stake in a signatory.  In that 
case, a soft drink producer entered into a licensing agreement 
with a subsidiary of another soda producer to “market and sell an 
orange soda under the ‘Sunkist’ brand name.”52  The licensing 
agreement contained a broadly worded arbitration clause.53  
Following the execution of the licensing agreement, the 
 
47 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757–58 (11th 
Cir. 1993); see also Denney v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2005). 
48 See Rosenhouse, supra note 41, § 2. 
49 Id. 
50 See generally id. (outlining the rights of particular nonsignatories to compel 
arbitration of a signatory’s claim under a theory of equitable estoppel). 
51 Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d at 756–57. 
52 Id. at 755. 
53 Id. The license agreement stated:  
[A]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or 
the breach thereof, including those regarding termination or failure to 
renew this Agreement, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with 
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the 
award rendered by the Arbitrators may be entered in any Court having 
jurisdiction thereof. 
Id.  
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subsidiary was acquired by Del Monte, a second beverage 
company, and stripped of its employees and management.54  
Sunkist promptly sued Del Monte alleging tortious interference 
with the licensing agreement and Del Monte, although a 
nonsignatory to the licensing agreement, sought to stay the suit 
and compel arbitration based on the same agreement.55  Del 
Monte successfully argued that because Sunkist’s claims were 
essentially contractual in nature, it was “fundamentally unfair” 
to allow the beverage company to frame its causes of action as 
sounding in tort and thus avoid its contractual obligation to 
submit its claims to arbitration.56  The district court was 
convinced that Sunkist was “actually suing to enforce provisions 
of the licensing agreement” and consequently referred the claims 
to arbitration.57  Sunkist attempted an interlocutory appeal, 
which was denied for lack of jurisdiction under § 16 of the FAA.58  
After the arbitration proceeding, Sunkist again sought to appeal, 
and this time the court upheld jurisdiction.59  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that Del Monte could compel Sunkist to arbitrate 
its claims because the claims were “intimately founded in and 
intertwined with the underlying contract obligation.”60  The court 
reasoned that arbitration was proper because Sunkist’s claims, 
although sounding in tort, alleged that the nonsignatory 
beverage company violated the license agreement.61  And, since 
the subsidiary “ceased operating” and was absorbed into the 
beverage company upon its purchase, the beverage company was 
bound by the subsidiary’s agreement as a matter of law.62 
Like Sunkist, Thixomat v. Takata Physics International Co.63 
also involved a subsidiary.  However, Thixomat falls within the 
second relational category because the dispute in that case arose 
from an agreement made concurrently with the sale of goods.  
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 755–56. 
56 Del Monte Corp. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1:186-cv-1583-RLV, 
1988 WL 415059, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 1988). 
57 Id. at *2. 
58 Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d at 756. The court did not discuss the reason for 
the denial of appellate jurisdiction, and there is no written opinion concerning the 
issue. See id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 757–58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 See id. at 758. 
62 Id. 
63 No. 01 Civ. 5449(RO), 2001 WL 863566 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2001). 
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There, a company that owned a patent for metal molding 
technology and sold machines utilizing the technology entered 
into a sales agreement with Takata, a Japanese corporation.64  
The contract provided for the purchase of several of the molding 
machines.65  It included both an arbitration clause and a clause 
stating that the molding technology was confidential.66  When 
Takata leased the molding machines to Takata Physics, a wholly 
owned subsidiary, a dispute arose about whether the 
confidentiality provision in the original licensing agreement had 
been breached.67  An arbitration proceeding was initiated, but 
Thixomat, the signatory, moved to stay the arbitration, arguing 
that it had not agreed to arbitrate with the subsidiary.68  The 
district court held that Thixomat could be compelled to arbitrate 
the dispute with the nonsignatory subsidiary.69  It reasoned that 
because of the close relationship between the subsidiary and the 
parent company, the fact that both entities sought an identical 
remedy and because the claims arose “from one common nucleus 
of operative facts,” they were “intimately founded in and 
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations” and had to 
be referred to arbitration.70 
Palmer v. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp.71 is a case that 
falls into the third relational category because it involves claims 
by a nonsignatory that provided goods and services to a 
signatory.  There, mortgagors brought an action against both a 
bank that refinanced their home and a life insurer that denied 
their life insurance claim.72  The suit was the result of a joint 
mortgage and life insurance deal gone awry.73  Before they 
brought the lawsuit, the mortgagors executed a promissory note 
to refinance their home and used some of the money to take out a 
life insurance policy with a life insurance company owned by the 
 
64 See id. at *1–2. 
65 Id. at *1. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *3. 
70 Id. The court also noted that the fact that an arbitration proceeding had 
already been initiated and the fact that the conflict was international in nature were 
additional factors that moved the court to rule in favor of arbitration. Id. at *4.  
71 198 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Miss. 2002). 
72 Id. at 823. 
73 Id. 
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mortgagee bank.74  Although the mortgagor paid the premiums to 
the mortgagee bank, the bank hired another company, American 
Bankers Life Insurance, to actually insure the life.75  When one of 
the mortgagors died, American Bankers, the nonsignatory, 
refused to pay, claiming that the mortgagors made 
misrepresentations on their application.76  The court granted 
American Banker’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a 
clause in the promissory note even though American Bankers, 
the insurer, never signed that agreement.77  The court stated that 
since the mortgagors alleged that the mortgagee bank acted as 
an agent for American Bankers and since the mortgagor plaintiff 
alleged “interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the 
nonsignatory Defendants and the signatory [lenders],” the claims 
were sufficiently intertwined to compel arbitration.78 
II. INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE REVIEW OF ARBITRATION 
ORDERS 
Section 16 of the FAA governs appellate review of all court 
orders concerning arbitration.79  The framework of the statute 
reflects the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.80  “Its 
inherent acknowledgment is that arbitration is a form of dispute 
resolution designed to save the parties time, money, and effort by 
substituting for the litigation process the advantages of speed, 
simplicity, and economy associated with arbitration.”81  In line 
with this goal, § 16 denies a litigant the ability to immediately 
appeal when the court compels arbitration82 but permits an 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 825–26. 
78 Id. 
79 William G. Phelps, Annotation, Appealability of Order Staying, or Refusing To 
Stay, Proceeding in Federal District Court Pending Arbitration Procedure, 110 A.L.R. 
FED. 148 (1992). Prior to the enactment of § 16 on November 16, 1988, courts applied 
the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine to appeals from orders concerning arbitration. See 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 284, 287 (1988) 
(overturning the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine in the wake of the merger between courts 
of law and equity). 
80 See 15B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.17 (2d ed. 2010); see also Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). 
81 David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, Appeals from Arbitrability 
Determinations, in 9 U.S.C.A. § 16 (West 2010). 
82  
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immediate appeal when the court refuses to compel arbitration.83  
Specifically, the statute provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken 
from . . . an order . . . refusing a stay of any action under section 
3 . . . [or] denying a petition under section 4 of this title.”84  Thus, 
§ 16 gives a party seeking to compel arbitration more avenues to 
seek appellate review than a party trying to avoid arbitration, 
reflecting the policy of the FAA to encourage arbitration.85   
Enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to 
Justice Act, § 16 was a small piece of a much larger effort by 
Congress to overhaul the federal court system and allow it to 
cope with the enormous caseload overflowing its dockets.86  The 
only legislative history concerning § 16 is a brief summary of its 
purpose articulated by members of the House of Representatives:  
“[I]nterlocutory appeals are provided for when a trial court 
rejects a contention that a dispute is arbitrable,” however, 
“appeals are specifically prohibited . . . when the trial court finds 
that the parties have agreed to arbitrate [the dispute].”87 
 
 
Except as otherwise provided in § 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be 
taken from an interlocutory order—(1) granting a stay of any action under 
§ 3 of this title; (2) directing arbitration to proceed under § 4 of this title; 
(3) compelling arbitration under § 206 of this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin 
an arbitration that is subject to this title.  
9 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006). 
83  
An appeal may be taken from—(1) an order—(A) refusing a stay of any 
action under § 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under § 4 of this title to 
order arbitration to proceed, (C) denying an application under § 206 of this 
title to compel arbitration, (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an 
award or partial award, or (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award. 
Id. § 16(a). 
84 Id. 
85 See Siegel, supra note 81. 
86 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 22 (1988). In urging his fellow 
congressmen to vote for the bill, Representative Kastenmeier stated,  
Enactment of court reform legislation is similar to creating a quilt. The 
entire fabric of our system of justice is woven piece by piece through the use 
of State and Federal courts, traditional litigation and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. This bill solidifies the tapestry of American justice 
by strengthening the Federal and State court systems and by encouraging 
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. I urge my colleagues 
to support the bill. 
134 CONG. REC. 31,871 (1988). 
87 H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 36–37. 
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Since its enactment, courts have applied § 16 in a variety of 
ways,88 sometimes reaching “puzzling” conclusions.89  Recently, a 
disagreement has arisen between the circuits over the grant of 
appellate jurisdiction when a nonsignatory seeks to compel 
arbitration based on equitable estoppel.90 
The disagreement involves the references made by § 16 to § 3 
and § 4 of the FAA.91  Section 4, which gives the court the power 
to compel arbitration, contemplates a dispute involving “an 
agreement in writing for arbitration.”92  Similarly, § 3, which 
empowers the court to stay proceedings on application from one 
of the parties, requires an “issue referable to arbitration under 
an agreement in writing.”93  Relying on these references to a 
written agreement, the D.C. Circuit and Sixth Circuit ruled that 
a nonsignatory seeking to compel a signatory to arbitrate a 
dispute could not appeal an order by a district court mandating 
litigation because there was no written agreement between the 
parties.94  The Fifth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
however, took the opposite position, reasoning that the writing 
requirement was met when it appeared that the nonsignatory 
has a meritorious equitable estoppel claim.95 
At its core, the circuit split existed because courts were 
unclear how to reconcile the idea of equitable estoppel with the 
language in § 16 of the FAA that permits interlocutory appeals.  
In the cases that made up the circuit split, the nonsignatory used 
 
88 See, e.g., Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc Moctezuma S.A. v. Mont. Beverage Co., 330 
F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2003) (appellate jurisdiction was dependent upon the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate). 
89 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 80, § 3914.17 (stating that the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc Moctezuma S.A. v. Montana Beverage Co. was 
“puzzling” because the court erroneously reasoned that the gateway jurisdictional 
question of arbitrability depended upon the merits of the case). 
90 See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 44–45 (1st Cir. 
2008) (acknowledging the “circuit split on [the] question of [interlocutory] appellate 
jurisdiction”). 
91 “An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . refusing a stay of any action 
under section 3 . . . [or] denying a petition under section 4 of this title . . . .” 
9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
92 Id. § 4. 
93 Id. § 3. 
94 See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallett-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 601–
02 (6th Cir. 2008); Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice Litig. v. Sprint 
Commc’ns Co., 428 F.3d 940, 942–43, 945 (10th Cir. 2005); DSMC, Inc. v. Convera 
Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
95 See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Waste Mgmt., 
Inc. v. Residuos Industriales Multiquim, S.A., 372 F.3d 339, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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equitable estoppel as an “offensive sword” rather than its 
traditional role as a “defensive shield” to assert that the 
signatory could not deny the existence of a written arbitration 
agreement.96  Appellate courts found this use of equitable 
estoppel difficult to reconcile with the language of § 3 and § 4, 
which seem to require a “written agreement for arbitration” or an 
“issue referable to arbitration” as a prerequisite to interlocutory 
appellate jurisdiction.  The circuits disagreed as to whether the 
writing requirement was met when a claim was based on 
equitable estoppel.   
A. The Circuit Split Leading up to Arthur Anderson 
The D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to bar an 
interlocutory appeal by a nonsignatory seeking to compel 
arbitration through equitable estoppel.97  In DSMC Inc. v. 
Convera Corp.,98 Judge Roberts,99 writing for the D.C. Circuit, 
applied § 4 of the FAA narrowly.  According to Judge Roberts, § 4 
“applies only to an ‘alleged failure . . . to arbitrate under a 
written agreement for arbitration’—not an alleged failure to 
arbitrate when principles of equitable estoppel indicate that you 
should.”100   
The facts of DSMC were complicated.101  The case involved a 
contract dispute that arose out of the alleged theft of trade 
secrets.102  Initially, NGTL, a division of National Geographic 
Magazine, contracted with DSMC, a company providing digital 
cataloging services, to create a digital database for thousands of 
hours of video.103  The contract included a broadly worded 
arbitration clause and a provision protecting DSMC’s proprietary 
right to its software.104  Dissatisfied with performance, NGTL 
fired DSMC and hired Convera Corporation, a competitor. “To 
 
96 Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 45, 56 (1996). 
97 See generally DSMC, 349 F.3d 679. 
98 Id. 
99 Hon. John G. Roberts Jr. currently serves as Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court. He was appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
2003, the same year he authored the opinion in DSMC. 
100 DSMC, 349 F.3d at 683. 
101 See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallett-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 
600–01 (6th Cir. 2008). 
102 DSMC, 349 F.3d at 681. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
 16 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW COMMENTARY [Vol. 84:1   
facilitate the switch,” NGTL gave Convera a copy of the database 
created by DSMC.105  Subsequently, DSMC initiated an 
arbitration proceeding against NGTL pursuant to their 
agreement and sued Converain federal court, alleging copyright 
infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets.106  Convera 
then sought to compel arbitration based on the agreement 
between NGLT and DSMC.  However, the district court refused 
to grant Convera’s motion..107  It reasoned that DSMC’s claims 
against Convera were not “inextricably intertwined with the 
contract” because regardless of NGLT’s breach of its “contractual 
obligation to maintain confidentially[,]. . . Convera’s obligation to 
DSMC . . . [did] not arise out of that contract, but rather from 
state and federal statutes and common law.”108  The district court 
explained in dictum that if DSMC had alleged a more overt 
contract law claim—like tortious interference with the contract—
the court would have been more willing to grant a motion to 
compel arbitration.109Since DSMC’s claims were for 
misappropriation of trade secrets and civil conspiracy, its motion 
to compel arbitration was denied.110  The district court also 
denied a motion made by NGTL to stay the litigation between 
DSMC and Convera.111  It reasoned that a motion to stay should 
be granted according to the court’s discretion, and “the simple 
fact that [the same] issues may be resolved in both fora” is not a 
sufficient reason to stay litigation.112 
The interlocutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit concerned two 
issues and involved all three parties.  First, NGTL, which was a 
signatory to the agreement but not a party to the lawsuit, 
petitioned the court to stay litigation pending the outcome of the 
arbitration proceeding between itself and DSMC.113  In addition, 
Convera, the nonsignatory defendant, sought to compel DSMC to  
 
 
 
105 See id.  
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 681–82. 
108 DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2002). 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. at 30–31. 
112 Id. at 30. 
113 DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2003), abrogated 
by Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).  
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arbitrate its claims based on the agreement between DSMC and 
NGTL.  The court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear 
the issues raised on appeal by NGTL and Convera.114  
Roberts based his decision primarily on the plain language in 
§ 16 of the FAA.  He first looked at § 16, which incorporates § 4 
by reference.  Section 16 specifically permits interlocutory 
appeals taken “from an order denying a petition under section 4” 
of the FAA.115  Roberts then examined § 4 of the FAA, which 
“applies only to an ‘alleged failure . . . to arbitrate under a 
written agreement for arbitration.’ ”116  Because DSMC never 
signed an arbitration agreement with Convera, and its appeal 
was based on “principles of equitable estoppel,” Roberts reasoned 
that the “written agreement” requirement was not met, and 
consequently, DSMC could not establish jurisdiction for its 
interlocutory appeal.117  The court similarly concluded that there 
was no jurisdiction to immediately appeal NGTL’s motion to stay 
litigation pending the outcome of an arbitration proceeding.118  
Since the motion was based on equitable estoppel, the D.C. 
Circuit reasoned that there was no arbitration agreement and 
thus, no “issue referable to arbitration.”119 
In support of his new rule concerning the application of 
equitable estoppel to interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, Roberts 
reasoned that it was best to have “bright-line” jurisdictional rules 
concerning the application of equitable estoppel rather than to 
engage in a “multifactor factual and legal inquiry to determine 
whether the issues to be litigated . . . are sufficiently intertwined 
with the issues subject to arbitration.”120  Roberts also correctly 
stated that interlocutory appeals generally are infrequently 
granted.121 
There are readily apparent holes in the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning in DSMC.  It is quite unclear whether plain language 
of § 3 and § 4 of the FAA denies nonsignatories the right to stay 
litigation or compel arbitration.  Language referencing a “written 
agreement” and an “issue referable to arbitration” is not ironclad 
 
114 Id. at 681–82. 
115 Id. at 682 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 Id. at 683 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). 
117 Id. at 683–84. 
118 See id. at 684–85. 
119 Id. at 684. 
120 See id. at 683–84. 
121 See id. at 683. 
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evidence that Congress intended to preclude nonsignatories from 
immediately appealing arbitrability questions.  In addition, the 
court’s policy argument that a bright line rule is preferable to a 
multifactor inquiry is misleading.  Although bright line rules are 
preferable when jurisdiction is at issue, it does not directly follow 
that there should be a bright line rule preventing interlocutory 
appeals.  Finally, although it is true that interlocutory appeals 
are infrequently granted, § 16 of the FAA explicitly permits a 
party to immediately appeal an order refusing to compel 
arbitration because of the the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration. 
In contrast to the approach taken in DSMC, the Fifth and 
Second Circuits decided that it is sometimes permissible for a 
nonsignatory to immediately appeal a refusal to compel 
arbitration.122  To come to this conclusion, both circuits looked to 
the merits of the nonsignatories’ equitable estoppel claims to 
decide whether they were parties to an arbitration agreement.  
They reasoned that appellate jurisdiction should be granted 
when the facts of a case clearly demonstratethat the 
nonsignatories claims were in fact “inextricably intertwined” 
with the underlying contract obligation.123  Although this 
approach allowed the appellate court to correct erroneous factual 
findings by the district court, it also blurred the line between the 
gateway jurisdictional question and the equitable estoppel issue. 
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction and the merits of the 
equitable estoppel claim can be difficult to separate in practice.  
It is hard to refuse interlocutory appellate jurisdiction when it is 
obvious that the district court committed a substantive error by 
refusing to acknowledge a nonsignatory’s legitimate equitable 
estoppel claim.  This was the problem faced by the Fifth Circuit 
in Waste Management, Inc. v. Residuos Industrailes Multiquim, 
S.A. de C.V.124  In that case, Waste Management (“WM”) was the 
original parent company of a corporation called RIMSA.125  To 
provide collateral for RIMSA to lease heavy equipment from The 
Bethlehem Corporation, WM provided Bethlehem with a letter of 
 
122 See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Waste Mgmt., 
Inc. v. Residuos Industrailes Multiquim, S.A. de C.V., 372 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
123 See Ross, 478 F.3d at 99. 
124 372 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2004). 
125 See id. at 340. 
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credit worth $795,000.126  After executing the letter, WM sold its 
majority stake in RIMSA to Onyx through a stock purchase 
agreement which included a “broad agreement to arbitrate.”127  
Unfortunately for WM, after the transfer, RIMSA defaulted on 
its obligation to pay for the equipment it leased from Bethlehem, 
and Bethlehem responded by exercising its right to collect on the 
letter of credit.128  WM was forced to pay Bethlehem the $795,000 
allocated in the letter.129  Not surprisingly, WM sued RIMSA for 
the balance.130  Around the same time Onyx initiated an 
arbitration proceeding against WM on unrelated claims and 
WM’s claim for reimbursement of the $795,000 became an issue 
in that matter.131  As soon as the issue of reimbursement became 
part of the arbitration proceeding, RIMSA, a nonsignatory to the 
arbitration agreement between WM and Onyx, sought to stay 
litigation with WM pending the arbitration outcome.132  The 
district court denied the stay and RIMSA appealed.133   
The Fifth Circuit found that RIMSA, a nonsignatory, had 
jurisdiction for its immediate appeal to enforce the stay.134  To 
reach this conclusion, the court examined the question from an 
entirely different perspective than the D.C. Circuit used in 
DSMC.135  The Fifth Circuit stated that the issue of appellate 
jurisdiction is essentially “identical to the substance of this 
interlocutory appeal.”136  Thus, the court ruled that the language 
in article 3 requiring an “issue referable to arbitration under a 
written arbitration agreement” only required that the issues to 
be litigated were bound up with the issues to be arbitrated.137  
The court found that because WM’s claims against RIMSA were 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 341. 
131 See id. at 340–41. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 340.  
134 Id. 
135 See id. at 342. 
136 Id. at 343. 
137 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit expresses three 
factors used to determine whether a nonsignatory can invoke § 3 and consequently 
have jurisdiction for an appeal: “(1) the arbitrated and litigated disputes must 
involve the same operative facts; (2) the claims asserted in the arbitration and 
litigation must be ‘inherently inseparable’; and (3) the litigation must have a ‘critical 
impact’ on the arbitration.” Id. 
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“identical” to WM’s claims against Onyx, interlocutory appellate 
jurisdiction was appropriate.138  The Fifth Circuit remanded the 
case to the district court with instructions to stay litigation.139 
By completely ignoring even the possibility that § 16 imposed 
a writing requirement through § 3, the Fifth Circuit was able to 
reach a just result relying solely on the merits of the 
nonsignatories’ equitable estoppel claim.  Although the outcome 
of the case was just, since the issues referred to arbitration were 
in fact “identical” to the issues to be litigated, the court’s 
reasoning was questionable.  The Supreme Court has established 
that a party’s right to appeal “cannot depend upon the facts of a 
particular case.”140  Rather, it is the role of an appellate court to 
address issues of law.  The Fifth Circuit crossed the line by 
relying on the merits of the case to decide a jurisdictional issue.  
However, under the D.C. Circuit’s rule discussed above, DSMC, 
the nonsignatory in Waste Management, would have been 
categorically denied an appeal and forced to litigate while the 
exact same issues were decided in a parallel arbitration 
proceedings.  This could force the nonsignatory to endure 
conflicting obligations if the arbitrator and jury reached opposite 
conclusions.  Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile the Fifth 
Circuit’s problematic rule with the just result reached in Waste 
Management. 
At its core, the circuit split boiled down to whether the goals 
of the FAA were best served by assigning a narrow meaning to 
§ 16 that created a bright line rule barring appeals by 
nonsignatories or whether the FAA’s strong federal policy 
favoring arbitration supported a broader interpretation allowing 
appeals.  This choice is especially difficult to make because ruling 
on the issue of equitable estoppel in the context of arbitration is a 
 
138 Id. at 344. The court examined the merits RIMSA’s application for a stay and 
reasoned that because there was “[f]undamentally . . . one dispute,” namely, 
“[w]ho . . . should reimburse WM for the $795,000,” the litigation and arbitration 
were “inherently inseparable,” and thus, there was an issue “referable to 
arbitration” under § 3 of the FAA, and consequently interlocutory appellate 
jurisdiction under § 16. Id. at 345. 
139 Id. at 346. 
140 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996) (“In any event, the question 
before us here—whether there is jurisdiction over the appeal, as opposed to whether 
the appeal is frivolous—must be determined by focusing upon the category of order 
appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order. 
‘Appeal rights cannot depend upon facts of a particular case.’ ” (quoting Carroll v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1957)).  
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decision that straddles the line between substance and 
procedure.  Considered broadly, when an appellate court rules on 
the issue of equitable estoppel, it is simply deciding whether the 
parties agreed to submit to arbitration, a function over which 
appellate courts explicitly have jurisdiction.141  However, when 
considered in a different light, deciding the issue of equitable 
estoppel can be viewed as “delv[ing] deeply into the merits of 
[the] case,”142 which cannot be undertaken until after the 
threshold issue of arbitrability has been decided.143   
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN ARTHUR ANDERSON 
As briefly discussed above, Arthur Anderson was a case 
about abusive tax shelters.144  The plaintiffs were three 
businessmen who wanted to sell their construction equipment 
businesses.  They purchased advice from an accounting firm, a 
law firm, and a financial services boutique about how to 
minimize their taxes following the sale.145  Collectively, the law 
firm, accounting firm, and financial services botique advised the 
construction company to execute a tax shelter strategy that the 
Internal Revenue Service later found to be illegal.  The tax 
shelter, called a “leveraged option strategy,” was “designed to 
create illusory losses” through investment in foreign-currency 
exchange options.146  Although the IRS initially offered immunity 
for these kinds of tax shelters, none of the defendant advisors 
informed the businessmen of this option, and the plaintiffs were 
forced to pay $25 million in penalties for using the shelter.147  
Although the financial services boutique was the only advisor 
that signed an arbitration agreement with the contruction 
company, the law firm and accounting firm nevertheless sought 
to stay litigation and compel arbitration based upon that 
agreement.148  The district court denied their motion and the 
defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit.  The 
 
141 AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 
142 DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
143 AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649–50. 
144 Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899 (2009). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
147 See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallett-Provost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 599 
(6th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. 1896. 
148 Id. 
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circuit court denied jurisdiction and adopted the reasoning of the 
D.C. Circuit in DSMC that appellate jurisdiction should be 
denied unless a litigant has signed a written arbitration 
agreement.149  The Sixth Circuit quoted Judge Roberts, who 
stated that, “to the extent possible, clear, predictable, bright-line 
rules . . . [should] be applied to determine jurisdiction with a fair 
degree of certainty from the outset.”150  In fact, the vast majority 
of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion was borrowed from the D.C. 
Circuit’s reasoning in DSMC.151 
In the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Scalia began his 
analysis of the jurisdictional issue by explaining that the FAA 
provides an exception to the general rule that appellate courts 
only have jurisdiction over district courts’ “final decisions.”152  
Scalia then goes on to decide the case in two sentences:  under 
the “clear and unambiguous” language of § 16, “any litigant who 
asks for a stay under § 3 [of the FAA] is entitled to an immediate 
appeal from denial of that motion—regardless of whether the 
litigant is in fact eligible for a stay . . . .Because each [litigant] in 
this case explicitly asked for a stay[,] . . . the Sixth Circuit had 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial.”153  Thus, the 
Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by taking a middle 
ground; it created a bright-line rule allowing interlocutory 
appeals by litigants seeking to arbitrate claims based on 
equitable estoppel.  The Court took issue with both sides of the 
circuit split.  Scalia criticized the lower courts for “conflating the 
jurisdictional question with the merits of the appeal;”154 the 
merits question, according to the Court, is irrelevant and should 
only be dealt with “after the court has accepted jurisdiction over 
the case.”155  The Court went on to reject the Sixth Circuit’s rule 
that a litigant is “categorically ineligible for relief” by virtue of 
the fact that they did not sign a written arbitration agreement.156  
The court regarded the rule as an artificial statute of frauds that 
had no basis logical connection § 16 of the FAA.  Section 16 states 
 
149 See id. at 600–01. 
150 See id. at 601 (quoting DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 683 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
151 See id. at 600–01.   
152 Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. at 1900 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 1901. 
156 Id. at 1902. 
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that “[a]n appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . refusing a 
stay of any action under section 3 of this title.”157  In turn, § 3 
contemplates an issue that is “referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing.”158  The Court explained that since § 2 of 
the FAA governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements, if 
an agreement is binding under § 2, it is enforceable under § 3.159  
To determine whether an agreement is enforceable under § 2, 
state contract law must be consulted.160  And “[b]ecause 
traditional principles of state law allow a contract to be enforced 
by or against nonparties to the contract through . . . estoppel,” a 
nonparty does not have to meet a writing requirement to appeal 
an order refusing to stay litigation under § 16.161  Finally, Scalia 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that allowing these kinds of 
appeals will lead to frivolous appeals.  According to Justice 
Scalia, sanctions are an appropriate remedy in those cases.162 
The dissenting option authored by Justice Souter and joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens is short but direct.  
Souter argued that the “firm congressional policy against 
interlocutory or piecemeal appeals” favors reading § 16 and § 3 
together to create a writing requirement for litigants seeking an 
interlocutory appeal based upon estoppel.163  According to Justice 
interlocutory appeals are “a matter of limited grace” and can be 
extraordinarily disruptive to the litigation process.164  Therefore, 
it follows that a writing requirement should be implemented as a 
matter of policy to “limit the scope” of appeals by nonsignatories.  
Justice Souter contends that this measure is necessary to 
“mitigate[ ] the risk of intentional delay by savvy parties who 
seek to frustrate litigation by gaming the system.”165 
 
 
157 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
158 Id. § 3 (emphasis added). 
159 See Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. at 1901–02. 
160 See id. at 1902. 
161 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
162 See id. at 1901. 
163 Id. at 1903 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Id. at 1904. 
165 Id. 
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A. Analysis 
The congressional intent of § 16 of the FAA is quite clear:  
“[I]nterlocutory appeals are provided for when a trial court 
rejects a contention that a dispute is arbitrable under an 
agreement of the parties and instead requires the parties to 
litigate.”166  Contrary to the dissenting opinion’s assertion that 
§ 16 is a limited grant of jurisdiction and should be narrowly 
construed, the statutory intent found in the congressional record 
suggests that Congress envisioned a much broader exception for 
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction when a district court refuses 
to compel arbitration.167  A broad exception similarly comports 
with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.168  Although 
Justice Scalia does not examine the legislative history, he 
reaches the same result by invoking the plain meaning of § 3 and 
through principles of contract law.  Scalia is right on the law.  It 
is an established principle of contract law that “an obligation to 
arbitrate” can still “attach” when a party has not “personally 
signed the written arbitration provision.”169  If both a signatory 
and a nonsignatory should be bound by an arbitration agreement 
as a matter of law, it stands to reason that either party should be 
able to immediately appeal an incorrect district court decision 
holding otherwise. 
However, as Scalia himself acknowledges, “[w]hen the reason 
for a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.”170  The dissenting 
opinion in Arthur Anderson implies that taking an interlocutory 
appeal from an order refusing to compel arbitration is a delay 
tactic employed by defendants to “wear down the opponent” 
through a “lengthy” appeals process.  No doubt that was the 
reason the rule was employed in the Arthur Anderson case.  
There, the two parties seeking the appeal were the law firm and 
 
166 H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 37 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 
5997. 
167 “By providing a party who seeks arbitration with swift access to appellate 
review, Congress acknowledged that one of the principle benefits of arbitration, 
avoiding the high costs and time involved in judicial dispute resolution, is lost if the 
case proceeds in both judicial and arbitral forums.” Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004). 
168 See 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 80, § 3914.17; see also Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). 
169 Fisser v. Int’l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1960). 
170 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF 
PERSUADING JUDGES 30 (2008) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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accounting firm.  Both businesses were being paid to provide tax 
advice, yet failed to discover that the tax scheme they 
recommended had become illegal. Even further, they failed to 
realize that the IRS was offering safe harbor for companies who 
embarked on the scheme.171  Therefore,he law firm and the 
accounting firm each had a motive to delay litigation in an effort 
to get the plaintiffs to settle.  In this particular situation, a 
writing requirement makes sense—the district court should 
definitively decide which forum should be employed and the 
parties should move to the merits instead of squabbling over 
procedure.   
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion fails to grasp an 
important reason for allowing litigants to appeal the district 
court’s decision to refuse to grant a stay—the possibility of 
inconsistent results.  Besides the threshold decision concerning 
where the merits of a dispute should be vetted, § 3 of the FAA 
also deals with motions to stay litigation pending the outcome of 
arbitration proceeding already in progress.  Most cases in which 
one litigant is seeking to compel arbitration through equitable 
estoppel also involve another party who has signed an arbitration 
agreement and will arbitrate the dispute.  If the litigant seeking 
to arbitrate through equitable estoppel is denied a stay, it is 
possible that the results between the litigation and the 
arbitration proceeding will be inconsistent.172  This is the main 
reason why appellate courts tied the question of jurisdiction to 
the merits of the equitable estoppel claim.  Therefore, both the 
policy and the law favor a bright-line rule allowing interlocutory 
appeals under § 16 of the FAA. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Justice Scalia resolved the circuit split by 
imposing a rule that categorically favors arbitration over 
litigation.  Thus, a company that did not even sign an arbitration 
agreement with its adversary can now appeal an unfavorable 
decision by a trial judge to hear its lawsuit in court.  Considering 
the purpose of the FAA, which is to reduce the size of the federal 
docket, this conclusion seems logical.  Nevertheless, it is 
 
171 See Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899 (2009). 
172 See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757–
58 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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important to recognize that as the complexity of agreements 
subject to arbitration continues to grow, so will the intricacies of 
the disputes concerning who can enforce the clause.  In light of 
the overarching goal of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to promote efficiency, it is paramount that courts 
adopt the most simple and efficient means of resolving these 
fights. 
